A force for good

A force for good

France and Britain are leading the intervention in Libya. Rightly so

Mar 24th 2011 | from the print edition

 

 

 

WHETHER it was out of rashness or conviction, Nicolas Sarkozy has certainly acted boldly. The French president was first to recognise the “national council” in Benghazi, first to talk of the need for air strikes and first to send planes to repel Muammar Qaddafi’s marauding forces. It was easily the biggest diplomatic and military moment of his presidency. So much for the old American canard about cheese-eating surrender monkeys.

 

Mr Sarkozy did not act alone, of course. His alliance with Britain’s David Cameron was essential. And America, belatedly, played an indispensable political and military role. Yet this action differs from the previous pattern of America leading and Britain following, with France opportunistically backing the Americans (Iraq, 1991) or opposing them (Iraq, 2003). This time America wants to stand back. So for the first time since the 1956 Suez crisis, Britain and France are at the forefront of military action in the Middle East. This is not to say they are reverting to old-style imperialism; both are too enfeebled for that. The British and French know they must act together to exert any influence. And to do that, they must overcome the legacy of Suez.

 

In 1956 the two colluded with Israel to attack Egypt and retake the Suez Canal, which had been nationalised by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, saw him as a new Hitler. The French resented his support for resistance to their rule in Algeria. America considered the assault as an act of imperialism that would inflame the Arab world and benefit the Soviet Union. It forced the invaders to withdraw, granting Nasser a victory, bringing about Eden’s downfall, hastening decolonisation and ushering in an era of American dominance in the region.

 

Britain and France, whose alliance dated to the entente cordiale of 1904 and two world wars, drew opposite lessons from this humiliation. The British resolved to cleave to America. Even their nuclear missiles were provided by the Americans. France chose greater autonomy. It sought to build up the European project as a counterweight to America and to create its independent nuclear force de frappe. A decade later it withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command.

 

As two medium-sized European powers, both with permanent seats on the UN Security Council and a legacy of empire, Britain and France are at the same time natural partners and natural rivals. These days, they are being pushed into greater co-operation. one reason is Mr Sarkozy’s decision to return France fully to the NATO fold. Another is the weakening of French demands for the EU to develop its own military capability. Finally, the rising cost of advanced weapons is driving both to seek defence savings. In November Britain and France signed a defence pact to share capabilities, including research on nuclear warheads and the operation of aircraft-carriers. Welcome to the entente frugale, said the wags.

 

It is striking how in the European–led intervention in Libya the two big Europe-based institutions, NATO and the EU, have so far been left on the sidelines. This is in part because both have members who are sceptical or even hostile to the Libyan adventure, notably Germany and (in NATO) Turkey. In part it is because old habits die hard, even in the heat of military action in Libya. France resisted Britain’s wish to see NATO take over the mission. Britain opposed French attempts to get the EU to lead a naval force to enforce the arms embargo. A compromise is emerging: NATO will provide military co-ordination, but politicians from the allied parties will give political direction (see article, article). The EU may then use its embryonic military tools to offer humanitarian aid.

 

Given such cacophony, one begins to sympathise with the unilateralism of Donald Rumsfeld, the American defence secretary during the second Iraq war, who decreed that “the mission determines the coalition”. But as America has found in both Iraq and Afghanistan, institutional backing helps to maintain a coalition. Italy, among others, demanded NATO leadership. Another timeless lesson is the benefit of securing UN and Arab support. “Suez? This is different. In Suez, we did not have the Arabs,” says Alain Juppé, the French foreign minister.

 

The rest is silence

 

The Libyan crisis also punctures some inflated hopes about other European countries. Italy, the former colonial power, was hopelessly out of touch at first and remains a minor player. The east Europeans have been quiet. For all the talk of Germany emerging as a “normal” power, liberated from post-war guilt, it remains handicapped, with the pacifist impulse still extremely powerful. Germany wanted sanctions against Colonel Qaddafi, but balked when they failed to stop him. It would not even let its ships enforce the arms embargo on Libya. Germany’s aversion to the use of force, even by its allies, must raise new doubts about its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

 

Libya has equally exposed the absurdity of the dream of a European army. What good would this be if Germany (or some other peacenik country) refused to allow it to protect people against a tyrant on Europe’s doorstep? So the use of military force will remain a matter largely for those willing and able to exert it. That means Britain and France will continue to dictate the terms of European military engagement. They account for nearly half of Europe’s total defence spending and more than two-thirds of what it spends on military research and development. The more Britain and France can share resources, the better for Europe’s military power. Success in Libya could spur them to deeper integration; failure might push them apart again. The stakes in Libya are obviously high for the future of the Libyan people. But spare a thought for the future of European defence co-operation.

 

http://www.economist.com/node/18440961